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LEGALIZED AGE DISCRIMINATION
THOMAS R. KLASSEN* AND C.T. GILLIN**
RgsuM.
La retraite, et tout particulierement la retraite obligatoire, a pris de l'importance dans
la politique gouvernementale du Canada. Cet article passe en revue et analyse la
jurisprudence pertinente qui a t6 soigneusement formul&e, specialement par la Cour
supreme du Canada, au cours des dernieres decennies. L'article considere brievement
les decisions majeures survenues avant la Charte des droits et libertes dans les annees
quatre-vingt, examine les changements intervenus en 1990 avec l'application de la
Charte, analyse les developpements juridiques qui ont eu lieu au cours des cinq
dernieres annes, et termine par une analyse des repercussions de ces changements
juridiques sur les politiques gouvernementales. Nous maintenons que la Cour su-
preme a eu tort dans ses decisions initiales sur la Charte, qu'elle s'est appuy&e sur des
raisonnements socio-economiques comportant des lacunes et n'a pas suffisamment
pris en consideration les droits fondamentaux de la personne. Nous concluons que la
retraite obligatoire est une forme de discrimination juridique et que la lutte contre les
lois qui perpetuent la discrimination fond&e sur l'Age s'inscrit dans la droite ligne des
efforts historiques pour batir une societe equitable.
A n aging population-in particular, the aging of the baby-boom generation-along
with the changing character and organization of work,1 have made retirement-
related issues prominent in the public policy agenda. Among the most controversial
of these is mandatory retirement, that is, the age at which workers are no longer under
the protection of human rights legislation and therefore employers can unilaterally
end their employment. Upon attaining office in late 2003, Prime Minister Paul Martin
asserted, "I don't believe in mandatory retirement" and called for public debate. 2 One
quick response came from the president of the Canadian Auto Workers, who defended
mandatory retirement as providing "orderly employee turnover", job opportunities
for younger workers, and "a certain degree of job security for younger workers,
* Thomas R. Klassen is in the Department of Political Science, York University and
**C. T. Gillin is in the Department of Sociology, Ryerson University
1. These changes include the increased presence of women in the paid labour force, the mobility
of the work force, a growing marginal or underground sector, a deterioration of living stand-
ards, and ongoing technological developments.
2. Susan Delacourt, "Martin Opposes Mandatory Retirement" The Toronto Star (20 December
2003) A10.
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especially during periods of economic downturn" 3 In August 2004, the Ontario
Ministry of Labour announced and initiated a consultation process on revising laws
that permit compulsory retirement.4
Mandatory retirement policies are usually not determined by laws directly addressing
the age at which an employee must leave paid employment; rather, such policies
generally reflect employment practices embodied in pension plans and collective
agreements, within the context of human rights or other legislation, overseen by the
judicial and quasi-judicial systems. Nor are there consistent laws across Canada
concerning age and work. For example, employers covered by the Canadian Human
Rights Act can legally force workers to retire when they reach "the normal age of
retirement" for employees performing the same type of work.5 In Ontario, British
Columbia, and several other provinces it is legal to retire workers (who are employees
of provincially regulated employers) at age 65. Quebec and Manitoba (with some
exceptions) prohibit mandatory retirement at any age, while in New Brunswick the
termination of employment is linked to pension plan provisions.
The Supreme Court of Canada has had little difficulty determining that mandatory
retirement is discriminatory in the sense that it violates section 15 of the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms ; the debate has largely focused on whether mandatory
retirement is justifiable as a reasonable limit in light of section 1.6 In its rulings in the
past two decades on age-based discrimination in employment, specifically mandatory
retirement, the Supreme Court of Canada has made rulings that-often surprising
and sometimes inconsistent-provide the judicial foundation for the current manda-
tory retirement regime.
Our objective in this article is to review the jurisprudence that has been crafted by the
Supreme Court over the past two decades. In doing so, we illuminate the framework
that allows employers, unions, and others to treat older workers in a discriminatory
manner, and has given rise to the current social policy controversies. We proceed in
three steps. First, we briefly consider the pre-Charter decisions on forced retirement
by the Supreme Court to analyze the grounds of judicial determination. Second, we
trace the shift that occurred in 1990 with the application of the Charter to such cases.
Third, we examine the developments of the past five years in the judicial framework
3. Buzz Hargrove, Comment, "Mandatory Retirement Debate" The Globe and Mail (29 December
2003).
4. Ministry of Labour, Providing Choice: A Consultation Paper on Ending Mandatory Retirement
(Toronto: Ministry of Labour, August 2004).
5. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. I(c).
6. For example, in McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [McKinney], as discussed
below, the majority of the Supreme Court determined that mandatory retirement violated the
rights guaranteed by section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but was justified
as a reasonable limit under section 1.
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of mandatory retirement. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the social policy
implications of the legal shifts of the past two decades.
PRE-CHARTER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Before the existence of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,7 emergent federal and
provincial human rights legislation, employment laws, common law, and judicial
findings governed mandatory retirement. Comprehensive human rights legislation
was instituted initially in the 1960s (for example, the Canadian Bill of Rights passed in
1960 and the first comprehensive Ontario Human Rights Code in 1961). It was brought
about largely in response to the civil rights movements that challenged the stigmatizing
effects in the workplace of race and ethnicity, and-much later-of sexual orientation
and other putatively objective conditions that limit opportunities and freedoms
associated with minority status. The result in both federal and provincial legislation
was a number of grounds-race, age, gender, disability, and others-on which dis-
crimination, that is, the withholding of advantages available to other workers or
applicants for employment, was prohibited.
The leading Supreme Court case of the 1980s that focused on mandatory retirement
revolved around the question of bona fide occupational requirements (BFOR). In
Ontario Human Rights Commission et al. v. Borough of Etobicoke,8 the Supreme Court
staked out a progressive position on ageism and mandatory retirement. The case
focused on the legality of mandatory retirement at age 60 for Ontario firefighters.
Under the then Ontario human rights legislation, workplace discrimination based on
age was illegal, with the protection having an upper limit of age 65 for the purposes
of employment; however, the Code also provided that an employer may discriminate
on the basis of age when age is a bona fide qualification or requirement. 9 On behalf of
a unanimous Court, Justice McIntyre wrote,
We all age chronologically at the same rate, but aging in what has been termed the
functional sense proceeds at widely varying rates and is largely unpredictable. In cases
where concern for the employee's capacity is largely economic ... and the circum-
stances of employment require no special skills that may diminish significantly with
aging, or involve any unusual dangers to employees or the public that may be com-
pounded by aging, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that a manda-
tory retirement at a fixed age ... may be validly imposed ... 10
7. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
8. Ontario Human Rights Commission et al. v. Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 [Etobicoke].
9. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, s. 4(6), provided as follows: "The provi-
sions of this section relating to any discrimination, limitation, specification or preference for a
position or employment based on age ... do not apply where age ... is a bona fide occupational
qualification and requirement for the position or employment."
10. Etobicoke, supra note 8 at 209.
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Keeping in mind the qualified language concerning circumstances and risks, nonethe-
less, in this case the Court rejected ageist stereotypes and suggested that individual
capacity to work, or the demonstrated limits of that capacity, must be the basis of
judicial decisions. In Etobicoke the Court held that the employer had not shown that
compulsory retirement was a BFOR for the employment concerned.
The Court also provided a standard for when a bona fide occupational requirement
can be used to justify mandatory retirement. The retirement rule or practice must meet
both a subjective and an objective test. On behalf of the Court, Justice McIntyre wrote
that, in order to be a bona fide occupational qualification and requirement,
the limitation, such as a mandatory retirement at a fixed age, must be imposed honestly,
in good faith, and in the sincerely held belief that such limitation is imposed in the
interests of the adequate performance of the work involved with all reasonable dispatch,
safety and economy, and not the ulterior or extraneous reasons aimed at objectives which
could defeat the purpose of the [human rights] Code. In addition it must be related in an
objective sense to the performance of the employment concerned, in that it is reasonably
necessary to assure the efficient and economical performance of the job without endan-
gering the employee, his fellow employees and the general public.11
This decision identified three key legal standards: (1) that it may be impossible for an
employer to defend mandatory retirement on largely economic grounds, (2) that
BFORs must meet both a subjective and objective test, (3) and that human rights are
fundamental and cannot be contractually varied.
In 1985, in Winnipeg School District No. 1 v. Craton,12 the Supreme Court considered
a conflict between Manitoba's Human Rights Act, 1 3 which prohibited age discrimina-
tion, and the Public Schools Act, 14 which empowered school boards to establish a
compulsory retirement age. A teacher won a declaration from the trial court that the
human rights legislation took precedence over the Schools Act and therefore, requiring
mandatory retirement at age 65, as provided for in her collective agreement, contra-
vened the Human Rights Act. The trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal to the
Manitoba Court of Appeal, and again by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court, in Craton, once again defended the special nature of human rights
legislation i5 and continued to express the general antipathy toward imposed retirement
first articulated in Etobicoke. The Court confirmed a legal presumption against forced
retirement, with the BFOR exception available under strict conditions. In the late 1980s,
as other mandatory retirement cases made their way through the appellate courts of
Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, it appeared likely to some that the Supreme
11. Etobicoke, supra note 8 at 208.
12. Winnipeg School District No. I v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150 [Craton].
13. Human Rights Act, 1974 (Man.), c. 65 (C.C.S.M., c. H175).
14. Public Schools Act, 1980 (Man.), c. 33 (C.C.S.M., c. P250, s. 50).
15. Craton, supra note 12 at 6.
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Court would eliminate compulsory retirement altogether under the newly enacted
Charter.16
LEADING DECISIONS UNDER THE CHARTER
The Charter was enacted in 1982, but section 15, which guarantees equality rights, did
not come into effect until 1985.17 One of its effects was a substantial expansion of
individual rights in Canada, for example, with regard to same-sex marriage and sexual
orientation. In the early 1980s, some anticipated that, building on the earlier decisions
emphasizing human rights, the new constitutional regime would lead to a view of forced
retirement at an arbitrary age as counter to the new prominence of individual rights. 18
A number of cases designed to test the application of the Charter reached the Supreme
Court during the late 1980s. 19 In 1990, the Supreme Court issued its first decisions
under the Charter focused on mandatory retirement: McKinney v. University of
Guelph,20 Harrison v. University of British Columbia,21 and Stoffman v. Vancouver
General Hospital.22 In all three cases, the Court was asked to rule if mandatory
retirement policies could violate section 15(1) of the Charter's "equal protection and
equal benefit" rights, but nevertheless be saved by section 1 as "reasonable limits". Of
the three, McKinney is the lead decision and is the focus of our analysis.
In 1987, the case of eight professors and one university librarian who were facing
forced retirement because they had reached the age of 65 was heard by the Court of
Appeal for Ontario in McKinney v. University of Guelph.23 The Court of Appeal had
16. Neil Finkelstein and Geoffrey Howard, "Retirement as a Case Study" (1998) 9:2 Advocates' Q.
142-59. In part, the optimism about change was fuelled by developments in the United States.
There, the Age Discrimination in Employment Admendments of 1986 (Public Law 99-592)
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to remove the existing 70-year
upper age limit applicable to employees who are covered under the Act.
17. Section 15 of the Charter provides as follows: "Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on ... age ... "
18. M. David Lepofsky, "The Canadian Judicial Approach to Equality Rights: Freedom Ride or
Roller Coaster?" (1992) 55:1 Law and Contemp. Probs. 167-99.
19. Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Thompson Educational Publishing, 1994).
20. McKinney, supra note 6.
21. Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [19901 3 S.C.R. 451.
22. Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483. Also decided in the same year,
Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College, [19901 3 S.C.R. 570 was ostensibly a
mandatory retirement case, but the legal issues raised were preliminary ones. The arbitrator, in
his award, argued that the Charter applied to Douglas College as a Crown agency and that the
collective agreement amounted to "law" subject to review under the Charter. These findings
formed the basis of the appeal. Neither the arbitrator nor the justices, on appeal, addressed the
issues of whether the equality clause was violated or whether the violation was reasonable.
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held that the Charter did not apply to universities because they were not part of
government. The Ontario court further found that the provincial Human Rights
Code,24 under which age protection for purposes of employment expires at age 65, did
not offend the Charter.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, 25 the justices overwhelmingly
agreed that the differential treatment permitted by the restricted definition of age in
the Code offended the equality rights guaranteed under section 15(1) of the Charter.
Thus, at its core, this case was about discrimination. 26 The reasoning of the majority
in McKinney was that discrimination based on the enumerated grounds specified in
the Charter is a social evil, and mandatory retirement deprives employees of a benefit
under the Code based on age, a ground explicitly identified in the Charter. The majority
determined, however, that the Charter could not rectify all evils. "Only government
requires to be constitutionally shackled to preserve the rights of the individual", Justice
La Forest wrote on behalf of the majority.27 The Charter protects individuals from
governmental abuse of power, not from the abuse of private power. Potential abuses
of private power may be regulated by governmental agencies, such as human rights
commissions, established to prevent, limit, and control private offences against the
rights of individuals. In short, since the universities were not government for purposes
of the Charter, its provisions did not directly apply to them, and relying on section
15(1) could not eliminate compulsory retirement at age 65.
Notwithstanding the determination that the Charter did not apply, the Court consid-
ered the issue of mandatory retirement socially pressing and furthered its analysis by
examining the constitutional status of the human rights legislation. In other words,
the Court focused not only on the equality rights guaranteed in the Charter but also
on whether Ontario's Human Rights Code,28 which permits employment discrimina-
tion against employees at age 65, met the test of constitutional validity contained in
the Charter. In Ontario, section 4(1) of the Human Rights Code, 1981 (now section
5(1)) provided for equal treatment:
Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without
discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizen-
ship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, same-sex
partnership status, family status or disability.
23. McKinneyv. University of Guelph, [1987] 63 O.R. (2d) 1.
24. Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53, ss. 4(1), 9(a) [now ss. 5(1), 10(a)].
25. McKinney, supra note 6.
26. The justices recognized that, based on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1
S.R.C. 143, the restricted definition of age constitutes discrimination under section 15(1) of the
Charter.
27. McKinney, supra note 6 at 262.
28. Human Rights Code, supra note 24.
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For the purposes of employment, however, the Ontario Code specified that "'age' means
an age that is eighteen years or more, except in subsection 4(1) where 'age' means an age
that is eighteen years or more and less than sixty-five years" 29 The result is that employers
could force employees into retirement at age 65 and that employers did not have to
provide equal treatment and opportunities in such matters as work conditions, work
load, salary, and benefits to employees who continue to work after age 65.
Having found the differential treatment based on age an affront to the principle of
equality, the Court rationalized the discrimination with a socio-economic argument.
Although the Court determined that the Ontario Code had the effect of permitting
forced retirement and thus discriminated on the basis of age contrary to section 15 (1)
of the Charter, such a policy was saved by section 1 of the Charter as a "reasonable
limit". The majority of the Court argued that retirement is a by-product of modern
society, that "65 has now become generally accepted as the 'normal' age of retirement"
and that "mandatory retirement has become part of the very fabric of the organization
of the labour market in this country".30 Moreover, the majority held that age is to be
distinguished from the other enumerated grounds. Justice La Forest wrote, "There is
a general relationship between advancing age and declining ability", whereas no such
correlation exists between any of the other specified grounds (e.g. race, colour, or
religion) and ability.31 Justice La Forest argued that in allocating social benefits, it is
acceptable to balance the competing needs of different generations.
Justice La Forest also established that the context for the discussion of retirement
policy is the importance of work in society.3 2 He cited Reference Re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alta.):33
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the indi-
vidual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in
society. A person's employment is an essential component of his or her sense of
identity, self-worth and emotional well-being. 34
Given its fundamental role in human life, work cannot be taken away without signifi-
cant justification. However, Justice La Forest's view was that compulsory retirement
at age 65 is reasonable because it has become part of the normal structure of the
organization of labour in Canadian society. Based on the Ontario appellate court's
arguments in Re McKinney, the Supreme Court of Canada saw mandatory retirement
29. Ibid., s. 9(a) [nows. 10(a)].
30. McKinney, supra note 6 at 294-95.
31. Ibid. at 660.
32. The following discussion is indebted to Colin G.M. Gibson and Lindsie M. Thomson, "Age
Discrimination: An Update" (Materials prepared for the Employment Law Conference, 2003,
Continuing Legal Education) [unpublished].
33. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.),[ 1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
34. McKinney, supra note 6 at 278.
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as allowing deferred compensation, facilitating recruitment, and avoiding continuous
productivity reviews, while permitting both employers and employees to plan for their
financial futures. The key legal elements of McKinney v. Guelph are summarized in
Table 1 below.
TABLE 1:
SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN MCKINNEY
(1990)
Opinions
La Forest, Cory Wilson L'Heureux-
Dickson, Dub6
Gonthier, and
Sopinka
Does Charter apply to retirement No Yes Yes No
provisions of universities?
If yes, does mandatory retirement Yes Yes Yes No need to
violate s. 15 of Charter? answer
Is the violation justifiable under Yes Yes No No need to
s. 1 of Charter? answer
Does s. 9 of the Ontario Human Yes Yes No Yes
Rights Code violate s. 15 of
Charter?*
Is the violation justified under Yes Yes No No
s. 1 of Charter?
Section 9 of the Ontario Human Rights Code protected against discrimination in employment of persons
ages 18 and above but less than 65.
The dissenting voices in the Supreme Court decision, the two female justices, took
issue with key points in the majority opinion. Justice Bertha Wilson reasoned that
section 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code was not saved by section 1 of the
Charter. She argued that because the Code fails to distinguish between those who are
able to work and those who are not, a rational connection between the policy and its
objectives had not been adequately established. She wrote that section 9(a)
operates to perpetuate the stereotype of older persons as unproductive, inefficient
and lacking in competence ... reinforcing the stereotype that older employees are no
longer useful members of the labour force and their services may therefore be freely
and arbitrarily dispensed with. 35
Moreover, Justice Wilson remained unpersuaded by her majority colleagues that free
collective bargaining justified the discrimination, noting "the vast majority of the
workforce is unorganized".36 She remarked further that immigrants, women, and the
35. Ibid. at 413.
36. Ibid. at 415.
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unskilled-"the most vulnerable employees"-would be the most affected by the lack
of legislative protection.3 7
Similarly, Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 found that section 9(a) of Ontario's Code
was not saved by section 1 of the Charter. She argued that the statute's restricted age
definition "is inconsistent with the fundamental values enshrined in s. 15(1): the
protection and enhancement of human dignity, the promotion of equal opportunity,
and the development of human potential based upon individual ability".3 8 In the
absence of any evidence concerning an individual's ability, age discrimination is
unwarranted. The reach of section 9(a) is overly broad, prohibiting not only com-
plaints of forced retirement but of any form of employment discrimination, including
hiring, demotion, transfer, or salary reduction. In a twist on Justice La Forest's
emphasis on the importance of work, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 wrote,
[I]f "in a work-oriented society, work is inextricably tied to the individual's self-
identity and self-worth," does this mean that upon reaching 65 a person's interest in
self-identity and stake in self-worth disappear? That is precisely when these values
become most crucial, and when individuals become particularly vulnerable to per-
ceived diminutions in their ability to contribute to society.39
In assessing the material repercussions of mandatory retirement, she emphasized that
women would suffer disproportionately because of lower lifetime earnings and lower
or no pension income.
Two years later, in 1992, the analysis provided by the majority in McKinney continued
to dominate the Court's reasoning about forced retirement. In Dickason v. University
ofAlberta,40 the issue of mandatory retirement in the university sector was once again
raised when a faculty member challenged mandatory retirement under Alberta's
human rights legislation. 41 The parties to the dispute agreed that the policy of
compulsory retirement contravened the provincial Act; the question was whether the
practice was constitutionally acceptable. The majority concluded that the university's
mandatory retirement policy was reasonable and justifiable.
In Dickason, the majority of the Court was guided by the analysis previously developed
in McKinney.42 Justice Cory wrote the majority opinion and argued that a collective
agreement that includes mandatory retirement at a fixed age provides evidence of the
reasonableness of compulsory retirement. Once again, age is conceived as distinguish-
able from other grounds of discrimination, reducing the level of defence needed to
37. Ibid.; also, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 noted, "The adverse effects of mandatory retirement are
most painfully felt by the poor" (at 433).
38. Ibid. at 424.
39. Ibid. at 430-31.
40. Dickason v. University of Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 [Dickason].
41. Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. c. 1-2.
42. Dickason, supra note 40 at 1127-28.
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justify forced retirement. As in McKinney, the socio-economic objectives of the retire-
ment policy were seen as sufficient to accept the limitation on the Charter's guarantee
of equality.43 The Court was again divided, with dissents from the female justices
L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin, as well as Sopinka-the last having formerly been
part of the majority in McKinney. Overall, the Court confirmed its shift on the issue
of mandatory retirement from a broad to a narrow interpretation of the provisions of
human rights codes.44
The most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision directly addressing mandatory
retirement is, at the time of this writing, a decade old. In 1995, the Court returned to
questions regarding bonafide occupational requirements in Large v. Stratford (City).45 A
police officer in Stratford, Ontario, faced mandatory retirement at age 60-a provision
in his collective agreement. The Ontario Human Rights Board of Inquiry found that the
provision of the collective agreement contravened the Human Rights Code. The Divi-
sional Court and the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of the Board. However, the
Supreme Court overturned the decisions made below it and allowed the City of Strat-
ford's defence of the mandatory retirement policy based substantially on the fact that
the policy was a provision of the collective agreement and was union-driven. 46. More-
over, the Court rejected the idea that individual accommodation was necessary, conceiv-
ing it as an "impermissible extension" of legal principles set out in earlier cases. 47
What is striking is that the Large ruling is unanimous and contradictory in its result
to Etobicoke. In the 1982 Etobicoke decision, before the Charter took effect, the Supreme
Court emphasized the human rights legislation was fundamental law and that clear
proof of danger to public safety was required to establish the BFOR. In 1995, under
the aegis of the Charter, the Large decision emphasized that mandatory retirement
policy was justified as a provision of a collective agreement and that the BFOR does
not require individual accommodation. The presumption had shifted from protecting
the individual right to work and the dignity associated with that to assuming contrac-
43. Justice Cory argued that, in the case of the University of Alberta, the compulsory retirement
policy was based on collective bargaining, presumably reflecting the best interests of the mem-
bers of the faculty association, and provided current job security (tenure) and future financial
security (a pension). Ibid. at 1131-34.
44. Shirish P. Chotalia, "The Supreme Court and Mandatory Retirement: Sanctioning the Status
Quo" (1993) 4:3 Const. Forum Const. 67-70.
45. Large v. Stratford (City), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 733 [Large].
46. Ibid. at para. 22, per Justice Sopinka for the majority. Note reference citations for Supreme
Court judgments change from page numbers to paragraph numbers, following reporting prac-
tice on the Supreme Court judgments website at <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/
index.html>.
47. Ibid. at para. 33. The Court argued that individual accommodation would be inconsistent with
the BFOR defence as determined in Bhinder v. CN, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, Saskatchewan (Human
Rights Commission) v. Saskatoon (City), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1297, Central Alberta Dairy Pool v.
Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489.
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tual arrangements justify at least some types of age discrimination. The underlying
legal implication was that just because it is possible for an employer to avoid a
discriminatory practice, it does not mean that it is necessary to do so. 48 Large con-
firmed the general trend for the Supreme Court to leave unchanged mandatory
retirement regulations and legislation.
As previously noted, the Supreme Court established a BFOR test in Etobicoke. In Large,
the majority of the Court held that an employer could meet the subjective "good faith"
element of the test without "belief in the necessity of the work-related requirement"
or arrangement, especially when the rule was a product of collective negotiation. 49
Moreover, the objective element requiring that the rule be "reasonably necessary"
could be met without requiring the employer to adjust job duties or individually test
employees.50 In short, the Court's reasoning in Large weakened the standard articu-
lated in Etobicoke. The rule of necessity became merely a rule of relevance. Under Large,
simply demonstrating some relevance between the policy and the purposes of the
enterprise was sufficient; the employer was not held to a higher standard of demon-
strating the necessity of the mandatory retirement policy or the difficulties in design-
ing a less burdensome policy, such as adjusting job duties or testing individuals.5 ' The
legal analysis in Large was generally consistent with the pragmatic socio-economic
analysis found in McKinney and companion cases.
SUBSEQUENT JURISPRUDENCE: A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS?
Tgtreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission),52 decided
in the wake of McKinney in 1991, highlights the importance of a case-by-case consid-
eration of the Court's position on age discrimination. The case, while not about
mandatory retirement, does speak to the underlying issues of equity and the dignity
of aging persons. Marcelle Ttreault-Gadoury lost her job and was denied ordinary
unemployment insurance benefits on the basis that she was over 65. Justice La Forest,
writing on behalf of a Court united in its conclusions, found that section 31 of the
Unemployment Insurance Act 53 of 1971 violated the Charter in terminating benefits at
age 65. Justice Forest wrote,
The most harmful and singular aspect of section 31 of the Act is that it permanently
deprives the applicant, and any other person of her age, of the status of a socially
insured person by making her a pensioner of the state, even if she is still looking for
48. David Beatty, "The Canadian Conception of Discrimination" (1996) 4 C.L.E.L.J. 263-82 [Beatty].
49. Large, supra note 45 at para. 23.
50. Beatty, supra note 48 at 268-69.
51. See also M.C. Crane, "Human Rights, Bone Fide Occupational Requirements and the Duty to
Accommodate: Semantics or Substance?" (1996) 4 C.L.E.L.J. 209-32 [Crane].
52. Titreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22
[T~treault-Gadoury].
53. Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1971-72, c. 48.
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a new job. Regardless of her personal skills and situation, she is as it were stigma-
tized as belonging to the group of persons who are no longer part of the active
population ... 54
The Court's consideration of this case soon after McKinney demonstrated that the
specific facts of each situation need to be examined, that employers could be required
to justify employment policies, and perhaps that its earlier decision was not intended
to provide a blanket judicial sanction of mandatory retirement. The Court expressed
its concern with the "insidious stereotype" of ageism, whether it results in intentional
or unintentional ("adverse impact") discrimination, and articulated a special concern
for economically vulnerable older citizens: "The most unfortunate aspect of s. 31 is
that it has the effect of denying unemployment benefits precisely to those who need
them most'"5 5 To what extent the Court's words hold more rhetorical or substantive
power will be discussed below. First, we need to consider the nature of the connection
between constitutional and human rights principles as they arise in jurisprudence and
apply to forced retirement.
The 1999 Meiorin decision addresses the BFOR issue and introduces a discussion of
a more unified approach. In British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations
Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., 56 the Court strengthened the standards to be met to
establish a bona fide occupational requirement and emphasized a human rights
approach to such cases. Justice MacLachlin (as she was then), writing for the Court,
overturned the Court of Appeal and upheld the arbitrator's determination to reinstate
a female firefighter who did not meet the aerobic tests designed by her employer. In
doing so, Justice McLachlin focused on the discriminatory effect of the impugned law,
de-emphasizing the different legal approaches to the analyses from a Charter or a
human rights perspective. She wrote, "I see little reason for adopting a different
approach when the claim is brought under human rights legislation which, while it
may have a different legal orientation, is aimed at the same general wrong as s. 15(1)
of the Charter'"57
Justice MacLachlin argued for a
unified approach that (1) avoids the problematic distinction between direct and
adverse effect discrimination, (2) requires employers to accommodate as much as
reasonably possible the characteristics of individual employees when setting the
workplace standard, and (3) takes a strict approach to exemptions from the duty not
to discriminate ... 58
54. Tgtreault-Gadoury, supra note 52 at 40.
55. Ibid. at 46.
56. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., [ 1999] 2 S.C.R.
3 ["Meiorin"].
57. Ibid. at para. 48.
58. Ibid. at para. 50.
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The emphasis on a stricter standard is a shift away from the 1995 decisions, which
accepted a lower standard of defence of age discrimination. 59 Justice MacLachlin
reinforced the importance of a strict approach by noting employers' obligations to take
individual and group differences into account. "By enacting human rights statutes and
providing that they are applicable to the workplace, the legislatures have deter-
mined that the standards governing the performance of work should be designed
to reflect all members of society, insofar as this is reasonably possible". 60 The
Court's focus seems to be shifting toward requiring employers to accommodate the
potential contributions of all employees based upon the right to have their human
dignity acknowledged in practical everyday employment situations-among other
places. The jurisprudence in Meiorin is based in part on a case decided earlier the
same year, Law v. Canada.
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),6 1 Justice Iacobucci,
writing on behalf of the Court, focused on the goal of assuring human dignity as a
way of defining the more abstract concepts of equality and discrimination. Relying on
Rodriguez v. British Columbia,62 Justice lacobucci wrote,
[Tihe equality guarantee in s. 15(1) is concerned with the realization of personal
autonomy and self-determination. Human dignity means that an individual or
group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychologi-
cal integrity and empowerment ... It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the
needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context
underlying their differences ... Human dignity within the meaning of the equality
guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se,
but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when con-
fronted with a particular law.63
In specific discussion of the purpose of section 15(1), the Court emphasized the
importance of "essential human dignity and freedom" and rejected differential treat-
ment based on stereotypical characteristics that has the effect of "perpetuating or
promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or less worthy of recognition
or value as a human being'"64 The Court also noted that under the Charter's equality
guarantee, dignity relates not to status per se, but "concerns the manner in which a
person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law". 65 It is notable that in
Law the Court's review of jurisprudence relied on a number of cases but made only
minor use of the McKinney decision. In spirit, if not by direct attribution, the unani-
59. Also see Beatty, supra note 48, and Crane, supra note 51.
60. Meiorin, supra note 56 at para. 68.
61. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [ 1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law].
62. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
63. Law, supra note 61 at para. 53.
64. Ibid. at para. 51.
65. Ibid. at para. 53.
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mous Court in Law echoes the voices of the dissents in McKinney and of human rights
principles.
That the current judicial situation concerning mandatory retirement and age-based
discrimination is ripe for change is illustrated by the fact that some lower courts and
arbitration bodies are urging the Supreme Court of Canada to reconsider the McKin-
ney decision. In 2000, an arbitration board in a case concerning the Greater Vancouver
Regional District rejected the argument that the law was settled by McKinney and ruled
that the Supreme Court of Canada contemplated a case-by-case determination. The
arbitration award was upheld by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in GVRD
Employees' Union v. Greater Vancouver Regional District.66 The majority of the appel-
late court upheld the arbitrator's finding that the employer was required to justify its
mandatory retirement policy under section 1 of the Charter, but also urged the
Supreme Court to reconsider the entire issue. In GVRD, Madam Justice Prowse wrote,
In the event that McKinney is found to stand for the proposition that all mandatory
retirement policies in the public sector which are not in contravention of provincial
human rights legislation are, therefore, justified under s. 1 of the Charter, I would
urge the Supreme Court of Canada to reconsider this issue ... The extent to which
mandatory retirement policies impact on other equality rights, and on the mobility
of the workforce, have become prominent social issues. 67
It remains an open question whether the Supreme Court of Canada is moving
definitely in the direction of giving greater weight to human rights principles. 68
Despite the Court's expressions of concern about ageism (identified above, for exam-
ple, in Ttrerault-Gadoury), Anderson raises the question whether government,
through its human rights legislation, is adequately redressing human rights abuses in
the private sector.69 Nevertheless, Anderson argues, the Court's acceptance of collec-
tive agreements as probative of the reasonableness of a practice challenged as discrimi-
natory, gives deference to private policies at the expense of human rights. The broad
vision of social and economic rights and a special concern for disadvantaged groups
are lost. The human rights codes "do not 'fill the charter gap' because they fail to
implement a more social democratic vision of human rights"7 0 Those aged 65 and
older constitute an economically disenfranchised minority with fewer statutory pro-
tections than younger employees. It is a systemic issue, inadequately addressed by legal
66. GVRD Employees' Union v. Greater Vancouver Regional District 2001 BCCA 435 [GVRD].
67. Ibid. at para. 127.
68. It has been argued that despite Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court continues to apply a restric-
tive interpretation of human dignity to persons with disabilities. See Ena Chadha and Laura
Schatz, "Human Dignity and Economic Integrity for Persons with Disabilities: A Commentary
on the Supreme Court's Decisions in Granovsky and Martin" (2004) 19 J.Law Soc. Pol'y 94-122.
69. Gavin W. Anderson, "Filling the 'Charter Gap?': Human Rights Codes in the Private Sector"
(1995) 33:4 Osgoode Hall L.J. 749-83.
70. Ibid. at 783.
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consideration that treats age discrimination as an aberrant individual matter. A whole
class suffers-often overlapping with other categories such as gender and ability.71
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
Along with the shifts and counter-shifts of jurisprudence in the past two decades,
considerable developments have occurred in the past five years in the legislative human
rights arena. With the Court's McKinney decision not yet overturned, more legal
attention has been given to the assumptions and implications of human rights legis-
lation. In 1999, the federal minister of justice established an independent panel to
conduct a review of the Canadian Human RightsAct, chaired by retired Supreme Court
Justice La Forest, who was on the majority side in McKinney, Harrison, Stoffman,
Dickason, Large, and Tetreault-Gadoury. One of the recommendations of the panel,
released in 2000, was that a review be undertaken of mandatory retirement "based on
human rights principles and socio-economic factors, to determine whether manda-
tory retirement should be subject only to the BFOR or whether more specific defences
should be crafted to allow for mandatory retirement in defined circumstances".
72
Additionally, the panel recommended that "there be no blanket defences for manda-
tory retirement': 73
Also in 1999, which was the International Year of Older Persons, the Ontario Human
Rights Commission began consultation on age discrimination, culminating with the
2001 report Time for Action: Advancing Human Rights for Older Ontarians. The report
was "a broad examination of all issues that may have an impact on the dignity and
worth of older adults and that may affect the enjoyment of equal rights and opportu-
nities".74 It emphasized the intersection of age with other designated categories-such
as gender, disability, sexual orientation, immigration status, race, and ethnicity. Spe-
cifically, with respect to mandatory retirement, the report recommended
That the [Ontario Human Rights] Code [1990] be amended to eliminate the blanket
defence to mandatory retirement at age 65 and to extend protection against age
discrimination to workers over 65. This could be done by removing the upper limit
of 65 in the definition of "age" in section 10(1). Employers who wish to have
age-based retirement policies will be required to demonstrate that the policy is
based on bona fide occupational requirements. Laws and programs that require
consequential adjustment should also be reviewed.
71. See Ontario Human Rights Commission, Time for Action: Advancing Human Rights for Older
Ontarians (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 28 June 2001).
72. Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (Ottawa: Minister
of Justice and the Attorney General of Canada, 2000) at 121.
73. ibid. at 121.
74. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Time for Action, at 9. Prior to Time for Action, the Ontario
Human Rights Commission published a discussion paper, "Discrimination and Age: Human
Rights Issues Facing Older Persons in Ontario" (2000). Subsequent to Time for Action, the
Commission published its Policy on Discrimination Against Older Persons Because of Age (2002).
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That, irrespective of whether the Code is amended, employers and unions reconsider
the utility and necessity of requiring employees to retire at age 65 and revise their
retirement policies and collective agreements to promote flexibility and choice. 75
This report set in motion increased public awareness and greater sensitivity to the issue
among political leaders resulting in a policy response in 2004, namely, a public
consultation in preparation for amending the Ontario Human Rights Code.76
CONCLUSIONS
The sequence of the Supreme Court decisions analyzed here challenges us to consider
whether the practice of forced retirement at an arbitrary age that applies in most of
Canada adequately reflects our society's commitment to fairness and the personal
self-worth of individuals. In the Etobicoke and Craton decisions reached during the
1980s, the Supreme Court treated age as an insufficient ground for justifying manda-
tory retirement. The Court expressed a presumption against forced retirement moti-
vated by largely economic concerns and established a strict BFOR standard for
exceptions, whereas, in McKinney and other cases decided in 1990, age became a
legitimate ground for achieving certain management objectives. In McKinney, the
Court retreated from its step toward a broad, purposive interpretation of equality and
replaced it with a position more reflective of classical liberalism, more protective of
the economic interests of the status quo than community values. In its mandatory
retirement decisions under the Charter, the Supreme Court displayed a disturbing
tendency to articulate principled positions and standards to be met in order to
establish the reasonableness of section 1 limits, then to slide past these standards
without addressing them in a convincing manner.
It may well be that the judges would prefer the legislators to decide mandatory
retirement issues.77 In McKinney the Court clearly deferred to legislators. More
recently, on other human rights issues, such as those dealing with sexual orientation,
the Court has been less deferential. 78 Nonetheless, we propose that in the past several
years the Supreme Court appears to have re-thought its McKinney decision and
repositioned itself to emphasize that in cases of inequality human dignity is para-
mount, rather than workplace or labour market conditions. In our view, in 1999, the
Court moved away from its earlier and sociologically flawed argument in McKinney
75. Ibid. at 40.
76. Ministry of Labour, supra note 4.
77. Thomas R. Klassen and C.T. Gillin, "The Heavy Hand of the Law: The Canadian Supreme
Court and Mandatory Retirement" (1999) 18:2 Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue cannadi-
enne du viellissement 259-76.
78. For example, in Vriend v. Alberta, [ 19981 1 S.C.R. 493, the Supreme Court read "sexual orienta-
tion" into Alberta's Individual Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980 c. 1-2. And in M v. H., [ 1999] 2
S.C.R. 3, the Court determined that the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 must apply to
same-sex as well as opposite-sex cohabiting couples.
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to a sounder legal argument in Law, emphasizing human rights and the "needs,
capacities and merits" of employees. 79 Whether Law has established a test for the
judiciary that will be objective enough remains to be seen, but it articulates an
approach that is likely to prove more effective against age discrimination, possibly
including mandatory retirement, than the guiding principles provided by McKinney.
Also in 1999, in the Meiorin case, the Court adopted a more stringent BFOR standard
that places a greater onus on employers to justify why individuals should not be
accommodated in the workplace.
Under the Constitution and the Charter, the courts have specific obligations to ensure
fairness and equity. In earlier eras, Canadians accepted discrimination in hiring and
wages based on race, gender, and marital status. Over the past several decades, the
worst forms of racism, sexism, homophobia, and discrimination against persons with
disabilities have been challenged and have been significantly lessened-though hardly
eliminated. This has been the result of judicial, legislative, and political actions. It is
past time to address the adverse effects of ageism.
Currently, the mandatory retirement regime in most parts of Canada is a form of legal
discrimination. Workplace management schemes, whether derived from collective
agreements, pension arrangements, or even provincial human rights codes, ought not
to trump the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Charter. Overcoming ageist
laws is an extension of the historical efforts to forge a society in which all persons share
equality and dignity in their common humanity. Regardless of amendments to human
rights legislation, it ultimately must be the role of the courts to protect the rights of
citizens.
Note: Some data for this article were obtained from interviews with officials of human
rights commissions, unions, and law firms. We thank Patrick Dickie for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft, Brian Eyolfson, senior staff lawyer, Aboriginal Legal
Services of Toronto, for his assistance and editorial guidance on this draft, and David
Forgione for his research assistance.
79. Law, supra note 61 at para. 53.

